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From Whence it Comes-Is the Message
More Revealing Than the Messenger?
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 115 S.
Ct. 1511 (1995)
Fear, anger, envy, indignation and shame are powerful emotions
in the political arena . . . . Go the distance . . . . Negative
campaigning is rarely pretty. Sometimes it doesn't feel very
good either. But once you've made the decision to inform the
voters of your opponent's shortcomings, stick to your guns....
Remember, you're playing to win.1
I. Introduction
In today's political arena, where negative campaigning and
character assassinations have replaced debate on the issues, voter
frustration is at an all-time high. Yet, in the recent Supreme Court
case of McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission,2 another weapon
has been added to the arsenal of permissible campaign speech. In
McIntyre, the Supreme Court struck down, on First Amendment
grounds, an Ohio election statute that required an attribution on
any publication promoting the "election or defeat of a candidate,
or... the adoption or defeat of any issue .... ."3 The Court found
that prohibiting the distribution of anonymous campaign literature
was an unconstitutional burden on the right to free speech.4 In its
wake, however, the Court has left several unanswered questions
concerning the scope of McIntyre's holding.
Although the precise reach of McIntyre is unclear, it is safe to
assume that politicians, candidates, and special interest groups
everywhere are planning ways in which this ostensible right to
1. Richard Harwood, Blood Sport, WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 1995, at A25 (discussing the
role played by "professional political consultants" in running a negative campaign).
2. 115 S. Ct. 1511 (1995).
3. Id. at 1514 n.3.
4. Id. at 1524.
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anonymous speech can be used. One can easily imagine the
following scenarios: A mayoral candidate and her campaign
manager devise the most effective way to smear her opponent; a
multinational corporation plans a mass mailing, designed to defeat
a referendum issue adverse to the corporation's interests; and a
lone leafleter distributes anonymous fliers, criticizing a proposed
school tax levy.
This Note proposes that the Majority in McIntyre substituted
its own judgment for that of the Ohio Legislature. Part II of this
Note provides a brief background of the controversy as well as the
statute that gave rise to it. Part III examines the procedural history
of McIntyre, focusing on the reasoning of the Court of Appeals and
the Supreme Court of Ohio. Part IV provides an in-depth
examination of the United States Supreme Court's treatment of
McIntyre by addressing the opinions of both the Majority and
Dissent. Part V provides a critical analysis of the Majority opinion,
arguing that the Ohio disclosure statute was reviewed under the
wrong level of scrutiny. Finally, Part VI addresses McIntyre's
holding and analyzes it in the context of other federal case law and
election statutes, in an effort to define the exact scope of the
Court's holding.
II. Background
The events that gave rise to this lawsuit began on April 27,
1988.5 Margaret McIntyre, a resident of Westerville, Ohio, printed
leaflets which contained comments highly critical of a proposed
school tax levy.6  She produced these leaflets on her home
computer and made copies at a local print shop.7 Mrs. McIntyre
then took her leaflets to the Blendon Middle School in Westerville,
where the school superintendent was discussing an upcoming
referendum vote on a school tax.8 As people filed into the
meeting room, Mrs. McIntyre handed a leaflet to each person.9
Meanwhile, Mrs. McIntyre's son and his girlfriend, distributed
additional leaflets in the school's parking lot by placing them on car
windshields."
5. Id. at 1514.
6. Id.
7. McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1514.
8. Id.
9. Petitioner's Brief at 8, McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. 1511 (No. 93-986).
10. Id.
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While Mrs. McIntyre was distributing her leaflets, the Assistant
Superintendent of the Westerville City School District approached
her and cautioned that the leaflets were not in compliance with
Ohio election laws." Undeterred, Mrs. McIntyre appeared at a
similar meeting the following evening, where she again distributed
leaflets. 2 The following week, the school tax levy was defeat-
ed. 3 The levy was defeated a second time three months later,
before finally passing in November 1988."4 Interestingly, it was
not until April 6, 1989, almost a full year later, that Mrs. McIntyre
received a letter from the Ohio Elections Commission informing
her that a complaint had been lodged against her. 5
As already noted, the leaflets distributed by Mrs. McIntyre
were produced on her home computer and copied at a local print
shop. Although some of the handbills identified her as the author,
other were merely signed "CONCERNED PARENTS AND TAX
PAYERS.'16  As such, Mrs. McIntyre was cited under Section
3599.09(A) of the Ohio Code (R.C. Section 3599.09(A)). 7 This
section requires all persons responsible for the production of
campaign literature pertaining to the adoption or defeat of either
a ballot issue or a candidate to identify themselves as the source
thereof.'" Since Mrs. McIntyre did not identify herself as the
11. McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1514.
12. Id.
13. Petitioner's Brief at 8, McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. 1511 (No. 93-986).
14. Id.
15. Id. See also McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 618 N.E.2d 152, 157 (Ohio 1993)
(Wright, J., dissenting).
16. McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1514. Admittedly, Mrs. McIntyre had intended to put her
name on all of the handbills.
17. The full text of the statute provides:
No person shall write, print, post, or distribute, or cause to be written, printed,
posted, or distributed, a notice, placard, dodger, advertisement, sample ballot, or
any other form of general publication which is designed to promote the
nomination or election or defeat of a candidate, or to influence the voters in any
election, or to make an expenditure for the purpose of financing political
communication through newspapers, magazines, outdoor advertising facilities,
direct mailings, or other similar types of general public political advertising, or
through flyers, handbills or other nonperiodical printed matter, unless there
appears on such form of publication in a conspicuous place or is contained within
said statement the name and residence or business address of the chairman,
treasurer, secretary of the organization issuing the same, or the person who issues,
makes, or is responsible therefore.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3599.09(A) (Baldwin 1988).
18. McIntyre, 618 N.E.2d at 152.
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source of the pamphlets, her conduct was a clear violation of this
provision.
III. Procedural History
After a hearing before the Ohio Elections Commission,
Margaret McIntyre was fined $100.00 for violating R.C. Section
35998.09(A).19 She appealed this ruling to the Franklin County
Common Pleas Court. The Court of Common Pleas reversed,
holding that the disclosure statute was unconstitutional as applied
to Mrs. McIntyre's conduct.2' This decision was appealed to the
Tenth District Court of Appeals.
A. Court of Appeals
The Tenth District Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's
decision and reinstated Margaret McIntyre's fine.21 The majority
found that the disclosure requirement was constitutional under its
prior decision in State v. Babst,22 which involved a similar constitu-
tional attack on the predecessor statute to R.C. Section
3599.09(A).' In Babst, the Ohio Supreme Court held that the
statute did not abridge the right to free speech, but was merely
regulatory in nature, intending to prevent abuse of the right.24
In contrast, the dissent argued that intervening decisions of the
United States Supreme Court undermined the continued validity of
Babst, and compelled a different result.25 The dissent cited Talley
19. McIntyre, 115 S. Ct at 1514.
20. McIntyre, 618 N.E. 2d at 152.
21. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, No. 90AP-1221, 1992 App. LEXIS 1951, at *1
(Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 7, 1992).
22. 135 N.E. 525 (Ohio 1922).
23. The predecessor statute, G.C. § 13343-1, provided as follows:
Whoever writes, prints, posts or distributes, or causes to be written, printed, posted
or distributed, a circular or advertisement which is designed to promote the
election of a candidate, or to injure or defeat any candidate for election at any
primary or any general election, or to influence the voters in any primary or any
general election, or to influence the voters on any constitutional amendment,
unless there appears on such circular or poster, or advertisement, in a conspicuous
place, either the names of the chairman or secretary, or of two officers of the
organization issuing the same, or of some voter who is responsible therefor, with
his name and address, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. ...
OHIO GEN. CODE § 13343-1 (repealed 1930).
24. Babst, 135 N.E. at 526 (noting that the statute was designed to prevent anonymous
statements that might easily result in fraudulent, corrupt practices).
25. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, No. 90AP-1221, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 1951,
at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 7, 1992).
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v. California,26 in which the Supreme Court invalidated a city
ordinance that prohibited all anonymous leafletting.27 However,
the handbills at issue in Talley were unrelated to the electoral
process. Instead, they urged readers to boycott certain Los
Angeles merchants who indirectly engaged in discriminatory
employment practices.28 Therefore, contrary to the dissent's view,
Talley is not controlling in a situation such as that involving
Margaret McIntyre.29
B. Supreme Court of Ohio
Margaret McIntyre challenged the decision of the Court of
Appeals, adopting the dissent's argument that Talley was control-
ling. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the
decision of the Court of Appeals by a divided vote and upheld the
constitutionality of the disclosure requirement.
1. The Majority. -The majority distinguished the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Talley, noting that the only
purpose of the ordinance at issue in Talley was to identify the
author of the handbills.3" Neither the text of the statute nor the
legislative history indicated an intent to prevent the "dissemination
of falsehoods., 31  In contrast, one of the clear purposes behind
R.C. Section 3599.09(A) is to identify those responsible for
26. 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
27. The ordinance at issue in Talley, however, had a much broader sweep than the
provision at issue in McIntyre. The ordinance in Talley provided:
No person shall distribute and hand-bill in any place under any circumstances,
which does not have printed on the cover, or the face thereof, the name and
address of the following:
(a) The person who printed, wrote, complied or manufactured the same.
(b) The person who caused the same to be distributed; provided, however, that
in the case of a fictitious person or club, in addition to such fictitious name, the
true names and addresses of the owners, managers or agents of the person
sponsoring said hand-bill shall also appear thereon.
Id. at 60-61.
28. Id. at 61. The merchants named in the handbills carried the products of
manufacturers who allegedly did not offer equal employment opportunities to Negroes,
Mexicans, and Orientals. Id.
29. As discussed infra notes 29-30 and accompanying text, the sole purpose of the
ordinance in Talley was to identify the author of the handbills. Although counsel for the
state tried to argue that the purpose was to identify those responsible for fraud, false
advertising and libel, the Court found that the ordinance was not so limited in either its text
or in its legislative history. Talley, 362 U.S. at 64.
30. McIntyre, 618 N.E.2d at 154.
31. Id.
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distributing materials containing false statements (i.e. fraud, libel,
or false advertising).
32
In addition, the majority recognized the equally persuasive and
important informational interest that was served through Ohio's
attribution requirement. Citing National Bank of Boston v.
Bellotti,33 the court noted that in judging and evaluating the
relative merits of conflicting arguments, the electorate should be
able to consider the source and credibility of the advocate.34 In
addition, the majority read the Supreme Court's dicta in Bellotti as
supportive of the type of disclosure requirement at issue in
McIntyre. In Bellotti, the Supreme Court stated: "Identification
of the source of advertising may be required as a means of
disclosure, so that the people will be able to evaluate the arguments
to which they are being subjected.... In addition, we emphasized
in Buckley,3 6 the prophylactic effect of requiring that the source
of communication be disclosed."37
Having identified the state's interests, the Ohio Supreme Court
then considered the appropriate test under which R.C. Section
3599.09(A) should be evaluated. Noting that election laws
invariably impose some burden upon the constitutional rights of
voters, the court rejected Mrs. McIntyre's argument that strict
scrutiny of the law was appropriate.38 The Supreme Court of
Ohio reasoned that "to subject every voting regulation to strict
scrutiny and to require that the regulation be narrowly tailored to
32. Id. This conclusion is apparent from two other provisions in the same chapter of
Ohio's election code, both of which prohibit persons from making false statements during
campaigns for public office and ballot issues. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3599.091(B),
3599.091(B)(2) (Baldwin 1996) (amended and recodified at OHIO REV. CODE ANN § 3517.21
(Baldwin 1996)).
33. 435 U.S. 765 (1978). Bellotti involved a statute which altogether prohibited
corporate expenditures opposing or supporting ballot (referendum) issues. The Court struck
it down on First Amendment grounds. Id.
34. McIntyre, 618 N.E.2d at 154.
35. Id.
36. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
37. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 791-92 n. 32 (citations omitted). Interestingly, both the majority
and dissent relied on different footnotes from the Bellotti decision as support for their argu-
ments.
38. McIntyre, 618 N.E.2d at 155 (citing Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788
(1983)). The Court in Anderson stated that each provision of the election code, "whether
it governs the registration and qualifications of voters, the selection and eligibility of candi-
dates, or the voting process itself, inevitably affects-at least to some degree-the
individual's right to vote and his right to association with others for political ends."
Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788.
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advance a compelling state interest ... would tie the hands of the
States seeking to assure that elections are operated equitably and
efficiently., 39 Instead, the Court found a more flexible standard
appropriate:
A court considering a challenge to a state election law must
weigh the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the
rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that
plaintiff seeks to vindicate, against the precise interests put
forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by
its rule, taking into consideration the extent to which those
interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff's rights.'
Under such a standard, the Court recognized that when the
burden on the constitutional right is severe, the law must be
narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state interest (strict
scrutiny test).41 On the other hand, when the state election law
imposes only "reasonable nondiscriminatory restrictions upon the
First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of voters, the State's
important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify the
restrictions.
42
Assessing the burden imposed by Ohio's disclosure statute, the
Court determined that the statute was not subject to strict scrutiny
review. Rather, the majority viewed the attribution requirement as
an insignificant burden on the right to free speech; it neither
impacted the content of a leafleter's message, nor significantly
impaired the author's ability to have it disseminated.4 3 Moreover,
the majority found that any burden was more than counterbalanced
by the state interests involved." As such, R.C. Section 3599.09(A)
survived constitutional attack.
2. The Dissent. -Contrary to the majority's view, the
dissenting judge characterized the attribution requirement as a
significant burden on one's freedom of expression.45 The dissent
pointed out the historical role anonymous writers played during the
most important ballot issue to date-ratification of the United
39. McIntyre, 618 N.E.2d at 155.
40. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788.
41. McIntyre, 618 N.E.2d at 155 (citing Norman v. Reed, 112 S. Ct. 698, 705 (1992)).
42. Id. at 155 (citing Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 155-56.
45. Id. at 156-57 (Wright, J., dissenting).
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States Constitution.46 He disagreed with the majority's proposi-
tion that the disclosure requirement imposes only an insignificant
burden on the right to free speech and that it has no impact on the
content of the message. Citing Talley, the dissent noted that
"compelled disclosure can chill the exercise of free expression by
persons who hold unpopular views and who may fear reprisal for
their views.
47
Characterizing the burden in such a way, the dissent would
have applied a strict scrutiny level of review to R.C. Section
3599.09(A). The dissent further criticized the majority for failing
to distinguish the nature of the disclosure requirement and the
parties who are subject to the requirement.48 For example, in the
"battle of the footnotes," the dissenting judge pointed to dicta in
National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, where the Court recognized
that different standards may apply to individuals and corporations
stating: "Nor is there any occasion to consider in this case whether,
under different circumstances, a justification for a restriction on
speech that would be inadequate [i.e., unconstitutional] as applied
to individuals might suffice to sustain the same restriction as
applied to corporations, unions, or like entities."49 In other words,
the dissent felt as though much of the case law relied upon by the
majority was misplaced. Interestingly, so did a majority of the
United States Supreme Court.
IV. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 1511 (1995)
On appeal, the Supreme Court of the United States reversed
Margaret McIntyre's conviction by a 7-2 decision. In doing so, the
Majority expanded upon the reasoning of the dissenting judge in
the court below.
46. McIntyre, 618 N.E.2d at 156 (Wright, J., dissenting).
47. Id. (citing Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64 (1960)). The dissent further
expressed a concern that the circumstances of McIntyre's case were suggestive of an
improper motive on the part of the school board official who filed the complaint. The com-
plaint, not lodged until a year after the violation and then only shortly after the levy finally
passed, was perhaps made in retribution for her opposition. Id. at 157.
48. Id. Judge Wright suggested that different rules applied depending on whether the
disclosure involved authorship of campaign literature or disclosure of contributions and
expenditures, and whether the disclosure requirement was directed at individuals, candidates,
or corporations. Id. at 156-59. These distinctions were later expounded upon by the
Supreme Court's decision in this case.




In an opinion by Justice Stevens, the Court invalidated R.C.
Section 3599.09(A) on First Amendment grounds."0 Although
Ohio maintained that the statute was a reasonable regulation of the
electoral process, the Majority found that the statute was a direct
regulation of the content of speech.51 As such, it was subject to
"exacting scrutiny."52 Under this level of review, the Court found
that the challenged law did not narrowly serve the state's interests.
The first interest advanced by the state was its interest in
providing the electorate with relevant information. The Majority
minimized this interest by characterizing the attribution require-
ment as simply a mechanism for supplying additional information
which the author is free to include or exclude. As support for its
position, the Court cited Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo.53 In Tornillo, the Court evaluated a Florida statute
requiring newspapers that assail the character of political candi-
dates to grant free space to the candidate for a reply.54 The Court
invalidated this "right to reply" statute as an unconstitutional
violation of the First Amendment's guarantee to freedom of the
press.5 Despite the state's information interest in providing the
public with a wide array of viewpoints, the Court remarked that
government could not compel a newspaper to publish "that which
reason tells [it] should not be published." 6 Similarly, the Court
50. McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. 1514 (1995).
51. Id. at 1518-19.
52. Id. at 1519.
53. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
54. The statute provided as follows:
If any newspaper in its columns assails the personal character of any candidate for
nomination or for election in any election, or charges said candidate with
malfeasance or misfeasance in office, or otherwise attacks his official record, or
gives to another free space for such purpose, such newspaper shall upon request
of such candidate immediately publish free of cost any reply he may make thereto
in as conspicuous a place and in the same kind of type as the matter that calls for
such reply, provided such reply does not take up more space than the matter
replied to. Any person or firm failing to comply with the provisions of this section
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree ....
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 104.38 (West 1996) (repealed 1979).
55. Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 258.
56. Id. at 256. The practical effect of complying with the Florida statute would exact
a penalty on newspapers. The newspaper would either face increased costs associated with
printing more material, or forego the opportunity to publish what it would have otherwise
published. Of course, the newspaper could avoid this Hobbesian choice altogether by simply
1996] 1059
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in McIntyre concluded that Margaret McIntyre could not be
compelled to place her name on the leaflets.57
The Court further minimized the state's informational interest
by downplaying the potential negative effects of an anonymous
publication. It commented:
Of course, the identity of the source is helpful in evaluating
ideas. But the best test of truth is the power of the thought to
get itself accepted in the competition of the market. Don't
underestimate the common man. People are intelligent enough
to evaluate the source of an anonymous writing. They can see
it is anonymous. They know it is anonymous. They can
evaluate its anonymity along with its message, as long as they
are permitted, as they must be, to read that message. And
then, once they have done so, it is for them to decide what is
responsible, what is valuable, and what is truth.58
The second interest advanced by the state was its interest in
preventing fraud and libel.5 While agreeing that this interest
carried considerable weight during election campaigns where false
statements, if credited, could have serious consequences for the
public at large, the Court noted that the state had protected this
interest through other provisions in its election code.' Specifical-
ly, R.C. Section 3599.09(A) was not seen as the principal weapon
against fraud, but simply an aid for enforcing these other provi-
sions.
61
not publishing anything critical of a candidate (thus triggering the requirements of the reply
statute). This result is clearly undesirable, standing in stark contrast to the original impetus
behind the First Amendment.
57. McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1520. "The simple interest in providing voters with additional
relevant information does not justify a state requirement that a writer make statements or
disclosures she would otherwise omit." Id.
58. Id. at 1519-20 n.l (citations omitted). Curiously, the Court also opined that "in the
case of a handbill written by a private citizen who is not known to the recipient, the name
and address of the author adds little, if anything, to the reader's ability to evaluate the
document's message." Id. at 1520. However, the Court provided no evidence regarding
whether or not Margaret McIntyre was known to the individuals to whom she distributed
leaflets. On such a small scale operation, in this unique context, it is quite possible that the
recipients would know the distributor.
59. Id. at 1520.
60. Id. 1520-21.
61. Id. The Court was also of the opinion that the state failed to explain how R.C.
§ 3599.09(A) could aid in the enforcement of Ohio's direct bans on disseminating false or
libelous statements. Id. In other words, the Court seems to believe that those individuals
who would disseminate false documents would also be likely to use false names on the
documents. Therefore, the attribution would be of no assistance.
1060 [Vol. 100:4
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Consistent with the dissenting judge's view in the lower court,
the Majority criticized the broad reach of the disclosure statute.
The Court explained that the attribution requirement applied not
only to candidates and their organized supporters, but also to
individuals acting independently and using their own modest
funds. 62 It applied not only to the elections of public officers, but
also to ballot issues that "present neither a substantial risk of libel
nor any potential appearance of corrupt advantage., 63 The statute
applied irrespective of any temporal concerns (i.e. distributing
leaflets months in advance versus the eleventh-hour anonymous
smear campaign). 64 Foreshadowing its position on future cases,
the Court concluded that the "State's enforcement interest might
justify a more limited identification requirement, but Ohio has
shown scant cause for inhibiting the leafletting at issue here.,
65
B. The Dissent
Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist lodged a vigorous
dissent, criticizing the Majority for its failure to examine the
competing issues presented by the case. The Dissent argued that
the issue should have been cast within the framework of the
electoral process. In other words, the Majority mischaracterized
the Ohio statute as "a governmental prohibition upon anonymous
electioneering in particular.,
66
While recognizing the historical importance of anonymous
political debate, the Dissent found the widespread and longstanding
acceptance of statutes similar to R.C. Section 3599.09(A) to be
compelling. "A governmental practice that has become general
throughout the United States, and particularly one that has the
validation of long, accepted usage, bears a strong presumption of
constitutionality., 67 Not only was the Ohio statute enacted almost
eighty years ago, but every state in the country except California
has a similar disclosure law.68 In light of such universal agreement
among the states, the Dissent would have taken a more deferential
approach.
62. McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1521.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1522.
66. Id. at 1532 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
67. McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1532.
68. Id. at 1532-33.
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A major point of departure from the Majority is seen in the
Dissent's characterization of the burden imposed by a disclosure
requirement upon the First Amendment right to free speech. The
Dissent found that the Ohio law did not in any way restrict the
expression of ideas but simply required the identification of the
speaker or publisher when the ideas are uttered in the electoral
context.69 Analogizing the case to Burson v. Freemen," the
Dissent viewed the burden as merely incidental,7" whereas the
Majority classified it as a "regulation of pure speech."72  This
distinction is critical because the characterization of the burden
dictates which level of scrutiny is applied to the law.
The Dissent further argued that the Majority's decision creates
a general right to anonymity for all, where precedent had only
established an exemption from disclosure laws to some.73 Such a
general right to anonymity is both unclear and unworkable.74
V. Critique
When one looks closely at the reasoning behind the Majority
opinion, it is clear that the strict scrutiny test was applied only as
a result of the Majority substituting its own judgment for that of
forty-nine legislatures. This substituted judgement can be seen with
respect to (1) the Court's characterization of the burden imposed
by the disclosure statute on one's free speech rights; and (2) the
Court's minimization of the effect of disclosure statutes on
preserving the integrity of the electoral process.
69. Id. at 1534.
70. 504 U.S. 191 (1992).
71. McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1534 ("It is at the periphery of the First Amendment, like
the law at issue in Burson, where we took guidance from tradition in upholding against
constitutional attack restrictions upon electioneering in the vicinity of the polling places.").
In Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992), the Court upheld a state law that prohibited
electioneering within 100 feet of the entrance to a polling place.
72. McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1518 no.10.
73. Id. at 1534-35.
74. Id. at 1535. To demonstrate the nebulous reach of the Majority's new rule, the
Dissent posed several hypothetical scenarios. For example, it questioned whether a
government periodical that has a "letters to the editor" section is now required to disavow
the policy that most newspapers have against the publication of anonymous letters; whether
a public university that makes its facilities available for a speech by David Duke or Louis
Farrakhan must refuse to disclose the identity of the group that sponsored or paid for the
speech; and whether a municipal "public-access" cable channel must now permit anonymous
(and masked) performers. Id.
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A. Burden Imposed by Disclosure Statutes
In the Ohio Supreme Court, R.C. Section 3599.09(A) was
reviewed under the "ordinary litigation" test established by
Anderson v. Celebrezze.75 Under this test, a court is to consider
the degree of the burden on a constitutional right, the interests of
the state, and the extent to which the state's interests necessitate
the contested restriction.76 Finding the burden to be both reason-
able and nondiscriminatory, the Ohio Supreme Court upheld the
disclosure statute.77
In contrast, the Supreme Court rejected the applicability of
Anderson, stating that the "ordinary litigation" test applies only to
laws regulating the mechanics of the electoral process. 71 The Ohio
disclosure statute, on the other hand, was seen by the Majority as
"a regulation of pure speech., 79 The Court noted:
[E]ven though this provision applies evenhandedly to advocates
of differing viewpoints, it is a direct regulation of the content of
speech. Every written document covered by the statute must
contain 'the name and residence or business address of the
chairman, treasurer, or secretary of the organization issuing the
same, or the person who issues, makes, or is responsible
therefor.' Furthermore, the category of covered documents is
defined by their content-only those publications containing
speech designed to influence the voters in an election need bear
the required markings. Consequently, we are not faced with an
ordinary election restriction; this case 'involves a limitation on
political expression subject to exacting scrutiny.' 8°
It is curious how the Majority can equate a simple name and
address requirement with a regulation of the content of speech.
Only in a hypertechnical sense is the disclosure requirement a
regulation of content. More appropriately, the disclosure is simply
a means for identifying the author, and is entirely unrelated to the
substantive message.
75. 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
76. Id. at 789.
77. McIntyre, 618 N.E.2d at 155-56.
78. McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1518.
79. Id.
80. Id. (citations omitted).
1996] 1063
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
Nonetheless, the Majority goes even further, insisting that the
disclosure requirement is a "limitation on political expression."81
However, such a conclusion could only be reached upon finding
that the disclosure requirement, in and of itself, would cause the
author to alter the message or forego publication altogether. In
other words, the Majority concluded that the attribution require-
ment was so burdensome that it would chill the exercise of First
Amendment rights.82
Such a conclusion is not only unsupported, but it stands in
stark contrast to the well-reasoned judgment of forty-nine state
legislatures.83 Disclosure laws have been enacted throughout the
United States, and bear "the validation of long, accepted usage. '
State legislators, who represent the views of their constituents, have
obviously concluded that the interests served by a simple disclosure
outweigh any burden on First Amendment rights. In the rare
instance where this is not the case-for example, for those who
hold unpopular views and fear reprisal-the response has been to
carve out an exemption for the disclosure requirement,85 not to
grant a general right of anonymity to all.86
In deciding to apply the strict scrutiny test to the Ohio
disclosure law, the Majority further pointed out that "the category
of covered documents is defined by their content-only those
publications containing speech designed to influence the voters in
an election need bear the required markings."'  The suggestion
seems to be that whenever a restriction is based on subject matter,
a strict scrutiny level of review automatically applies. However,
past decisions of the Court show that this is not always the case,
especially where important competing interests are at stake.88 In
81. Id. (emphasis added).
82. To see the fallacy of this argument, one need look no further than the case of
Margaret McIntyre. McIntyre did place her name on some of the leaflets. Indeed, there is
-no suggestion that the content of the message on the leaflets bearing her name was any
different than the content of the message on the anonymous leaflets.
83. See McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1533 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that every state, with
the exception of California has an attribution requirement).
84. Id. at 1532 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
85. See, e.g. Brown v. Socialist Workers, 459 U.S. 87 (1982); Bates v. Little Rock, 361
U.S. 516 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
86. In fact, the Court, prior to this case, rejected the proposition that there was any
general right of anonymity in speech. See Lewis Pub. Co. v. Morgan, 229 U.S. 288 (1913).
87. McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1518.
88. See, e.g., Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976). Greer involved a prohibition of
political activity, speeches, and demonstrations of a partisan nature on a military base. A
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McIntyre it cannot be disputed that there are compelling interests
involved. Reviewing prior decisions of the Court, the dissent
noted:
[N]o justification for regulation is more compelling than
protection of the electoral process. 'Other rights, even the most
basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined.' The State
has a 'compelling interest in preserving the integrity of its
election process.' So significant have we found the interest in
protecting the electoral process to be that we have approved the
prohibition of political speech entirely in areas that would
impede that process.89
Presumably, the Majority opinion did not discount the compelling
interest of the state in preserving the integrity of its electoral
process. Rather, the Court again substituted its judgement for that
of the Ohio legislature, concluding that the interests advanced were
not adequately served through the disclosure statute.
B. Effect of Disclosure Statutes
1. Informational Interest. -The State of Ohio claimed that
the disclosure statute provided the electorate with a means for
evaluating the merits of conflicting arguments. By knowing the
source behind the message, the reader would be better able to sort
through any issues of improper motivation, credibility, or bias on
the part of the author. Nevertheless, the Majority downplayed the
importance of this interest by stating:
Insofar as the interest in informing the electorate means nothing
more than the provision of additional information that may
either buttress or undermine the argument in a document, we
think the identity of the speaker is no different from other
components of the document's content that the author is free
to include or exclude.'
Again, however, the Majority failed to account for the special
context in which this issue appears. Although, in a limited sense,
regulation also prohibited the distribution of literature without prior approval of the base
commander. Although this was a subject matter prohibition, it was reviewed under a
deferential standard because of the public interest in military neutrality. Important to the
Court's analysis was that the regulations were applied in an evenhanded rather than
discriminatory manner. Id.
89. McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1534 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
90. Id. at 1519.
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the state's interest is an informational one, this informational
interest is intimately linked with preserving the integrity of the
electoral process.9
As support for its position, the Majority refers to Miami
Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,92 in which a Florida "right of
reply" statute was invalidated.93 The right of reply statute at issue
in Tornillo required newspapers to provide free. and equal space for
the reply of political candidates whose characters were assailed in
those newspapers.94 In striking down the statute, the Court
characterized the reply column as merely additional information
which the newspaper was free to include or exclude.95
The Majority's reliance on Tornillo is, however, severely
misplaced. It stretches the imagination to analogize a simple name
and address requirement to a reply column. A more correct
analogy of Tornillo to McIntyre would find Margaret McIntyre
distributing leaflets that included not only her anti-tax message, but
also the pro-tax message and arguments of the school board.
Clearly, this is not the mandate of R.C. Section 3599.09(A). The
disclosure statute simply provides a vehicle to establish some
degree of accountability.96
Accountability in the electoral process, specifically with regard
to campaign speech, is of paramount importance in a society
overrun with "mudslinging."97  The McIntyre dissent correctly
points out the utility of a disclosure requirement for promoting "a
civil and dignified level of campaign debate. '""8 It is only common
sense that individuals would be less likely to attach their names to
malicious leaflets than to positive materials. By requiring disclo-
sure, the state is also encouraging responsible advocacy, centered
more on the relevant issues than on smear tactics. If individuals
91. This interest is what separates McIntyre and Talley. The disclosure requirement at
issue in Talley was simply a means for identifying the author of all handbills, irrespective of
whether or not they were related to the electoral process. The information interest in Talley,
therefore, was not as compelling.
92. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
93. See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
94. Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 244.
95. Id. at 258.
96. Likewise, this measure of accountability is met in Tornillo because the editors are
always identified.
97. See Harwood, supra note 1, at A25 (noting that in 1960, slightly more than 20% of
news reports on candidates were "negative," whereas this figure grew to 60% by 1992).
98. McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1536.
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are not willing-perhaps even too proud-to attach their names to
the campaign literature that they have produced, then the literature
may be suspect. If, on the other hand, individuals can legitimately
claim a fear of reprisal because they hold unpopular views, then the
individuals are entitled to an exemption from the disclosure
requirements that have been recognized in prior cases.
The potential adverse effect that irresponsible campaign
literature can have on the voting public makes the state's informa-
tional interest even more compelling. The Majority placed an
unwarranted amount of faith in the voting public's powers of
perception when it remarked: "Don't underestimate the common
man. People are intelligent enough to evaluate the source of an
anonymous writing. They can see it is anonymous. They know it
is anonymous. They can evaluate its anonymity along with its
message."9 9 However, even the most sophisticated voters can fall
prey to misleading or irresponsible campaign literature. In fact, the
Dissent pointed out the practice of circulating an exceptionally
tasteless attack upon one's own candidate so that it will be
attributed to, and held against, the other side."°  Prior to
McIntyre, this behavior was a violation of the election laws which
could properly be sanctioned. With the newly created right to
anonymity, however, there is no way to deter this type of under-
handed campaign tactic.
2. Interest in Preventing Fraud and Libel. -Ohio's second
asserted interest was in preventing fraud and libel in the electoral
process. Although the Majority recognized the importance of this
interest, it pointed to other provisions in the Ohio election code
that directly prohibit individuals from making knowingly false
statements during the course of either candidate or issue elec-
tions.1°' Thus, the disclosure statute was seen as a mere aid to
enforcing these more specific provisions.
In light of the statute's more limited, ancillary purpose, the
Majority found that the "extremely broad" disclosure requirement
was unjustified. The Court commented:
The Ohio statute likewise contains no language limiting its
application to fraudulent, false, or libelous statements; to the
99. Id. at 1520 n. 11.
100. Id. at 1536.
101. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3599.091(B)(2)(10), 3599.092(B) (Baldwin 1988).
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extent, therefore, that Ohio seeks to justify § 3599.09(A) as a
means to prevent the dissemination of untruths, its defense
must fail for the same reason given in Talley. As the facts of
this case demonstrate, the ordinance plainly applies even when
there is no hint of falsity or libel. 02
Unlike Talley, however, the disclosure requirement in McIntyre is
limited to the electoral context, and any further limitation would
defeat its purpose. The suggestion of the preceding passage is that
Ohio should have drafted its disclosure statute more narrowly to
say, "[n]o person shall write, print, post, or distribute false,
fraudulent, or libelous [campaign literature] ... unless there
appears on such form of publication in a conspicuous place ... the
name and address of the person responsible therefore."1 3
Clearly, this is a ludicrous suggestion. The state cannot reasonably
expect the violators to identify themselves. It is the equivalent of
redrafting our criminal laws to say that no person shall rape,
murder, or steal unless he or she surrenders to the authorities.
Additionally, the Majority expressed its doubt that the
disclosure statute would assist in identifying prevaricators: -"Nor
has the state explained why it can more easily enforce the direct
bans on disseminating false documents against anonymous authors
and distributors than against wrongdoers who might use false
names and addresses in an attempt to avoid detection.""' The
Majority's concern with identifying liars and slanderers after the
distribution of campaign literature misses the mark. The real value
in the disclosure requirement lies in its deterrent effect. "[A]
person who is required to put his name to a document is much less
likely to lie than one who can lie anonymously." ' 5 Conversely,
under the Majority's newly created right to anonymity, one's
perceived risk of detection is severely diminished. This interpreta-
tion will likely have the effect of increasing false and fraudulent
statements, as well as contributing to the paucity of irresponsible
and tasteless campaign literature.
102. McIntyre 115 S. Ct. at 1517.
103. Compare OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3599.09(A) (Baldwin 1988). See supra note 17.
104. McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1522.
105. Id. at 1536.
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VI. Scope of the McIntyre Holding
One can hardly doubt that McIntyre has sent shock waves
throughout the political arena since the decision was handed down.
Political strategists everywhere have most likely been devising
creative and effective ways in which McIntyre's right to anonymity
can be used. However, a careful review of the Supreme Court's
past decisions suggests that the holding in McIntyre is limited to its
facts. In other words, Ohio could draft another disclosure statute
that would pass constitutional muster as long as it did not apply to
someone in Margaret McIntyre's unique situation.
A. Candidate Versus Issue Elections
When the state seeks to regulate the distribution of campaign
literature related to a candidate election rather than an issue
election, there are additional state interests to consider. For
example, the state has an interest in preventing libelous statements,
as well as false and fraudulent ones. Although libel does not
generally arise in referendum elections, it is definitely a concern in
candidate elections. Moreover, the consequences to a candidate of
a last minute smear campaign can be devastating.
Perhaps more importantly, in the context of a candidate
election, the state has an interest in avoiding the risk and appear-
ance of corruption. For this reason, the Supreme Court has upheld
reporting and disclosure requirements mandated by the Federal
Election Campaign Act. 6  In Buckley v. Valeo,7 a challenge
was lodged against, inter alia, the mandatory public disclosure
requirements for campaign-related expenditures. 8 In upholding
the requirements, the Court noted:
[D]isclosure requirements deter actual corruption and avoid the
appearance of corruption by exposing large contributions and
expenditures to the light of publicity. This exposure may
106. See 2 U.S.C. § 434(c) (1996) (independent expenditure report).
107. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
108. The relevant statute in effect today requires:
Every person (other than a political committee) who makes independent
expenditures in an aggregate amount or value in excess of $250 during a
calendar year shall file a statement containing the information required under
subsection (b)(3)(A) of this section for all contributions received by such
person.
2 U.S.C. § 434(c)(1)(1996).
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discourage those who would use money for improper purposes
either before or after the election. A public armed with
information about a candidate's most generous supporters is
better able to detect any postelection special favors that may be
given in return. . . . Congress could reasonably conclude that
full disclosure during an election campaign tends to prevent the
corrupt use of money to affect elections.1°9
In addition, it should be noted that the reporting and disclosure
requirements of the Federal Election Campaign Act apply only to
candidate elections rather than issue elections."' 0 In particular,
the disclosure requirements for independent expenditures are
"directed precisely to that spending that is unambiguously related
to the campaign of a particular federal candidate.'n l
The Court reiterated these sentiments in First National Bank
v. Bellotti.1 2  Bellotti involved a Massachusetts statute that
prohibited corporations from making expenditures for the purpose
of influencing votes on referenda that did not materially affect the
property, business, or assets of that corporation." 3 The Court
invalidated the statute, holding that the inherent worth of the
speech and its ability to inform the public "does not depend upon
the identity of its source, whether corporation, association, union,
or individual.""' 4 However, the Court did distinguish between
candidate and issue elections in discussing the state's interests:
"Referenda are held on issues, not candidates for public office.
The risk of corruption perceived in cases involving candidate
elections . . . simply is not present in a popular vote on a public
issue.''1
15
Also relevant to interpreting the scope of McIntyre is the
federal law regarding political ads and solicitations. Under federal
law, any communication that expressly advocates the election or
defeat of a candidate for federal office must include an attribution
identifying the individual or committee who paid for it.116 Not
109. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 67 (citations omitted).
110. See 2 U.S.C. § 434(c)(1).
111. Id. at 80.
112. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
113. Id. at 767-68.
114. Id. at 777.
115. Id. at 790 (citing United States v. United Auto. Workers, 352 U.S. 567 (1957);
United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106 (1948)).
116. 2 U.S.C. § 441(d) (1996).
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surprisingly, because of the lack of a national initiative or referen-
dum process, the law is silent on issue elections.
Taken together, Buckley, Bellotti, and the federal advertising
law suggest that the outcome in McIntyre may have been different
if the leaflets had addressed an upcoming candidate election.
Although the disclosures in Buckley related specifically to expendi-
tures, the Court's rationale would apply with equal force to
McIntyre. Admittedly, the Majority in McIntyre regard disclosure
of an expenditure as somewhat less intrusive than the disclosure on
an election-related writing. However, the addiional compelling
state interests involved in a candidate election will most likely tip
the scales in favor of disclosure."7
B. Big Money Versus Small Money
A second distinction, likely to develop through the focus in
case law, is who pays for the campaign literature. For example,
recall Bellotti, above. In Bellotti, the Court was specifically
concerned with a ballot election. To that end, the Court refused to
allow a prohibition on corporate expenditures involving referenda.
However, the Court did recognize the propriety of a disclosure:
"Corporate advertising, unlike some methods of participation in
political campaigns, is likely to be highly visible. Identification of
the source of advertising may be required as a means of disclosure,
so that the people will be able to evaluate the arguments to which
they are being subjected.""
n8
This language seems to suggest that an individual in Margaret
McIntyre's position could be subject to a disclosure requirement.
However, the Court qualified the above statement when it
remarked, "[n]or is there any occasion to consider in this case
whether, under different circumstances, a justification for a
restriction on speech that would be inadequate as applied to
individuals might suffice to sustain the same restriction as applied
to corporations, unions, or like entities."19 In McIntyre, the
Court interpreted this passage from Bellotti to mean that the First
Amendment's protection of corporate speech would not necessarily
117. Otherwise, the constitutionality of the federal advertising and solicitation law (2
U.S.C. § 441(d)) would be suspect if the medium chosen was one interpreted as "public
political advertising."
118. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at .792 n.32.
119. Id. at 777-78 n.13.
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be coextensive with the protection given to individuals. 1"° Thus,
after McIntyre, one could assume that a disclosure requirement on
literature funded or produced by corporations would be perfectly
valid.
The distinction between a corporation and an individual that
has evolved from Bellotti is grounded in a concern for big money
supporters over small money supporters. The Court has tried to
achieve a balance between protecting an individual's First
Amendment rights while guarding against the corrupting influence
of money. Again, this balance is exemplified in the federal
reporting requirements for independent expenditures.'21  The
federal law has struck this balance at $250.122 Any individual who
expends funds in excess of this limit is subject to this act's reporting
requirements.' 23  Because Buckley sustained such reporting
requirements, a state could likewise set a limit on expenditures,
which if exceeded would subject the individual to a disclosure
requirement.
C. Medium Chosen for Disseminating Message
A final distinction that needs to be drawn concerns the
medium chosen by an author for disseminating a campaign
message. Different mediums will often justify different First
Amendment treatment. Therefore, future decisions of the Court
are likely to vary depending upon the way in which individuals
inject their message into the marketplace.
An example of disparate treatment can be seen in the federal
advertising and solicitation law. 24 Again, under federal law, a
communication that expressly advocates the election or defeat of
a clearly identified candidate for federal office must include an
attribution if it is conveyed through public political advertising.1
5
Federal Election Conmission regulations interpret "public political
advertising" to include advertising through a broadcast station,
newspaper, magazine, poster, yardsign, outdoor advertising (such
as a billboard) or direct mail. 126 Although the type of political
120. McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1522.
121. 2 U.S.C. § 434(c) (1996).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. 2 U.S.C. § 441(d).
125. Id.
126. 11 C.F.R. § 110.11(a) (1995).
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advocacy engaged in by Margaret McIntyre would not be reached
under the federal law, its scope is nonetheless quite broad.
Adding to the complexity of campaign-speech regulations is
the separate set of rules for radio and television broadcasting that
has been established under the Federal Communications Act.
12 7
It is well-settled that broadcast frequencies are regulated by the
government."n "Without government control, the medium would
be of little use because of the cacophony of competing voices, none
of which could be clearly and predictably heard."129 Ultimately,
the Federal Communication Commission has established a twofold
duty on broadcast licensees: (1) The broadcaster must give
adequate coverage to public issues; and (2) The coverage must be
fair in that it accurately reflects the opposing views. 30
In light of the regulatory nature of the broadcasting industry,
it is obvious that any right to anonymity one might have in a radio
or television ad endorsing the election or defeat of a candidate or
issue will give way to the countervailing interest of the government.
Therefore, anonymous radio and television advertisements are not
likely. This conclusion should come as no surprise. The costs
associated with radio and television advertising invariably exceed
the expenditure disclosure minimums that trigger identification. A
more difficult question is the extent to which an attribution will be
required on less expensive forms of public political advertising (i.e.
yard signs, direct mail) outside of the federal context.
VII. Conclusion
McIntyre seems to be the embodiment of the phrase "bad facts
make bad law." Because the Majority was loathe to sanction
Margaret McIntyre for distributing leaflets which she produced with
her own modest funds, the current state of the law in at least forty-
nine states is unsettled. Moreover, the ambiguity in the Court's
holding provides little guidance to those in the political arena.
However, an examination of prior cases and federal law provides
some indication of a court's likely interpretation of permissible
campaign speech.
127. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1996).
128. Red Lion Broadcasting Co, v. Federal Comm. Comm'n, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
129. Id. at 376.
130. Id. at 377. Additionally, the opposing views must be presented at the broadcaster's
own expense if sponsorship is unavailable.
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First, it is now firmly established that disclosure cannot be
compelled of an individual distributing leaflets that pertain to an
issue election, where the expenditure does not exceed a certain
statutory threshold. Second, it is safe to assume that the same does
not hold true where a corporation is the distributor rather than an
individual. Third, under Buckley, a state could validly set an
expenditure limit whereby anything spent in excess thereof would
trigger reporting requirements. Just how low the state could set the
threshold without violating the Constitution, however, remains less
certain. Fourth, it is clear that different state interests are involved
in candidate elections than in ballot elections. Whether or not
Margaret McIntyre would have been sanctioned had she been
criticizing a candidate rather than a tax levy is questionable. At
any rate, these questions and more still remain. Through the
development of subsequent case law, it will be interesting to see
whether the Supreme Court will back away from the McIntyre
holding in the face of so much uncertainty, or whether the right to
anonymity will take on larger proportions.
Sherri L. Eyer
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